Detail publikace

Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices

HRUBÝ, M., PERINGER, P., RÁBOVÁ, Z.

Originální název

Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices

Anglický název

Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices

Jazyk

en

Originální abstrakt

This paper deals with modelling the certain security aspects of hardware implementations of cryptographic mechanisms. These implementations are called tamper-proof devices and they are typically smart cards or cryptographic coprocess. The design of most available tamper-proof devices does not deal with various forms of side effects of cryptographic algorithms execution. A side-channel is the term commonly used for places where such undesirable information appears. The volume and usefulness of information we are able to extract depends on the form of the side-channel. However, number of scientific papers proves that it is possible to effectively analyse information from side-channels and use the results for compromise of tamper-proof devices.

Anglický abstrakt

This paper deals with modelling the certain security aspects of hardware implementations of cryptographic mechanisms. These implementations are called tamper-proof devices and they are typically smart cards or cryptographic coprocess. The design of most available tamper-proof devices does not deal with various forms of side effects of cryptographic algorithms execution. A side-channel is the term commonly used for places where such undesirable information appears. The volume and usefulness of information we are able to extract depends on the form of the side-channel. However, number of scientific papers proves that it is possible to effectively analyse information from side-channels and use the results for compromise of tamper-proof devices.

Dokumenty

BibTex


@inproceedings{BUT16917,
  author="Martin {Hrubý} and Petr {Peringer} and Zdeňka {Rábová}",
  title="Modelling of Tamper-Proof Devices",
  annote="This paper deals with modelling the certain security aspects of
hardware implementations of cryptographic mechanisms.
These implementations are called tamper-proof devices and they are
typically smart cards or cryptographic coprocess. The design of most
available tamper-proof devices does not deal with various forms of side
effects of
cryptographic algorithms execution. A side-channel is the term commonly
used for places where
such undesirable information appears. The volume and usefulness of
information we are able to extract
depends on the form of the side-channel. However, number of scientific
papers proves that it is
possible to effectively analyse information from side-channels and use
the results for compromise of
tamper-proof devices.",
  booktitle="Proceedings of 38th International Conference MOSIS'04",
  chapter="16917",
  year="2004",
  month="april",
  pages="255",
  type="conference paper"
}