Publication detail

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

VESELÝ, Š.

Original Title

Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Type

journal article - other

Language

English

Original Abstract

The task of the experimental study reported here is to compare the amount of cooperation in the single-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game and in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We confirmed that subjects (N=45) in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games were more cooperative than subjects in single-trial games. We also found that there is less cooperation on the last move of an iterated game than there is in single-trial games. Theoretically speaking, defection is strictly dominant in single-trial games, as well as in games with known finite end. Empirically these predictions are usually not met, and were not met in our study. We offer reasons why this might be so – specifically, we discuss heuristic decision making rules that might account for cooperation in single-trial games.

Keywords

Prisoner's Dilemma, game theory, decision making, cooperation, heuristics, behavioural economics

Authors

VESELÝ, Š.

RIV year

2012

Released

12. 3. 2012

ISBN

1803-3865

Periodical

Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE

Year of study

21

Number

1

State

Czech Republic

Pages from

203

Pages to

212

Pages count

10

BibTex

@article{BUT90490,
  author="Štěpán {Veselý}",
  title="Nice {"}Prisoners{"}: Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma",
  journal="Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE",
  year="2012",
  volume="21",
  number="1",
  pages="203--212",
  issn="1803-3865"
}