Publication detail

Power Analysis Attack Based on the MLP in DPA Contest v4

MARTINÁSEK, Z. ZAPLETAL, O. VRBA, K. TRÁSY, K.

Original Title

Power Analysis Attack Based on the MLP in DPA Contest v4

Czech Title

Útok proudovou analýzou využívjící MLP na DPA Contest v4

English Title

Power Analysis Attack Based on the MLP in DPA Contest v4

Type

conference paper

Language

en

Original Abstract

Power analysis represents extremely effective and successful way of side-channels attacks on so far confidential cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic devices. One of the widespread countermeasures against these power analysis attacks is the masking approach. In 2012, Nassar et al. presented a new lightweight masking countermeasure to protect the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) implementation. This masking scheme represents the target algorithm of the DPA Contest v4. In this article, we present successful attack based on MLP (Multi-layer Perceptron) aimed on this masking countermeasure. For the first time, the MLP attack is used to reveal secret key from masked implementation of cryptographic algorithm. The article describes in detail every step of the attack implemented including the results achieved. Our attack reveal each byte of the secret key of the masked AES only with $23$ power traces.

Czech abstract

Proudová analýza představuje efektivní způsob útoku na kryptgrafické moduly. V dneštní době se používají algoritmy strojového učení namísto klasických šablon. Článek popisuje útok založený na MLP, který byl realizován na DPA Contest v4 implementaci AES.

English abstract

Power analysis represents extremely effective and successful way of side-channels attacks on so far confidential cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic devices. One of the widespread countermeasures against these power analysis attacks is the masking approach. In 2012, Nassar et al. presented a new lightweight masking countermeasure to protect the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) implementation. This masking scheme represents the target algorithm of the DPA Contest v4. In this article, we present successful attack based on MLP (Multi-layer Perceptron) aimed on this masking countermeasure. For the first time, the MLP attack is used to reveal secret key from masked implementation of cryptographic algorithm. The article describes in detail every step of the attack implemented including the results achieved. Our attack reveal each byte of the secret key of the masked AES only with $23$ power traces.

Keywords

Side channels, power analysis, MLP, neural network.

RIV year

2015

Released

09.07.2015

Publisher

IEEE

ISBN

978-1-4799-8497-8

Book

Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP)

Edition

1

Edition number

1

Pages from

154

Pages to

158

Pages count

5

URL

BibTex


@inproceedings{BUT117795,
  author="Zdeněk {Martinásek} and Ondřej {Zapletal} and Kamil {Vrba} and Krisztina {Trásy}",
  title="Power Analysis Attack Based on the MLP in DPA Contest v4",
  annote="Power analysis represents extremely effective and successful way of side-channels attacks on so far confidential cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic devices.
One of the widespread countermeasures against these power analysis attacks is the masking approach.
In 2012, Nassar et al. presented a new lightweight masking countermeasure to protect the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) implementation.
This masking scheme represents the target algorithm of the DPA Contest v4.
In this article, we present successful attack based on MLP (Multi-layer Perceptron) aimed on this masking countermeasure.
For the first time, the MLP attack is used to reveal secret key from masked implementation of cryptographic algorithm.
The article describes in detail every step of the attack implemented including the results achieved.
Our attack reveal each byte of the secret key of the masked AES only with $23$ power traces.",
  address="IEEE",
  booktitle="Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP)",
  chapter="117795",
  doi="10.1109/TSP.2015.7296242",
  edition="1",
  howpublished="online",
  institution="IEEE",
  year="2015",
  month="july",
  pages="154--158",
  publisher="IEEE",
  type="conference paper"
}